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There have been significant developments in the law of
workers' compensation since 1995, when the Annual Survey of
Virginia Law last included this topic. The past two years have
seen many changes in Virginia workers' compensation through
legislation by the General Assembly and by Virginia appellate
court decisions. This article focuses on some of the most signifi-
cant developments with respect to (I) occupational disease
claims, (II) injury by accident claims, (III) benefits and coverage
under the Workers' Compensation Act, (IV) third party claims,
(V) the termination of wage benefits, and (VI) new legislation
affecting workers' compensation.
I. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CLAIMS
A. Cumulative Trauma Claims
Perhaps the most significant development in Virginia
Workers' Compensation law in recent years was the Supreme
Court of Virginia decision in Stenrich Group v. Jemmott.'
Jemmott involved three separate cases (two carpal tunnel syn-
drome claims and one tenosynovitis, or "trigger thumb" claim)
in which the Virginia Court of Appeals had held that these
cumulative trauma conditions were compensable diseases, as
each case had medical evidence that the claimant's condition
was a "disease."' In Jemmott, the supreme court reversed 'the
three decisions of the court of appeals and held that gradually
* Partner, Williams & Lynch, Richmond, Vininia. B.B-A, 1984, James Madison
University; J.D., 1987, University of Richmond School of Law.
The author acknowledges the assistance of Vasiliki Moudilos, Associate, Wil-
liams & Lynch, in the preparation of this article.
1. 251 Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d 795 (1996).
2. Id. at 191-92, 467 S.E.2d at 798.
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incurred physical impairments are not diseases under the
Workers' Compensation Act.?
The decision in Jemmott came after the Supreme Court of
Virginia's 1993 decision in Merillat Industries, Inc. v. Parks.4
In Merillat, the supreme court held that in order for a condition
to be an occupational disease, the claimant's condition must
first qualify as a disease.5 While the supreme court in Merillat
failed to define the term "disease," the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals did so in Piedmont Manufacturing Co. v. East.? In
Piedmont, the court of appeals held that de Quervain's teno-
synovitis, a condition caused by cumulative trauma, was a dis-
ease and adopted the following definition for "disease:" "any
deviation from or interruption of the normal structure or func-
tion of any part, organ, or system (or combination thereof) of
the body that is manifested by a characteristic set of symptoms
and signs and whose etiology, pathology, and prognosis may be
known or unknown."7
In Jemmott, however, the supreme court declared that the
Piedmont definition of disease was too broad and was therefore
improper.8 Chief Justice Carrico, writing for the unanimous
court in Jemmott, concluded his opinion by emphatically stating
that "job-related impairments resulting from cumulative trauma
caused by repetitive motion, however labeled or however
defined, are, as a matter of law, not compensable under the
present provisions of the Act."9 Following Jemmott, it was clear
that unless the General Assembly enacted legislation to change
the relevant provisions of the Act, any condition resulting from
cumulative trauma caused by repetitive motion, including
carpal tunnel syndrome and tenosynovitis, would not be
compensable.
3. See id. at 199, 467 S.E.2d at 802.
4. 246 Va. 429, 436 S.E.2d 600 (1993).
5. See id. at 432-33, 436 S.E.2d at 601.
6. 17 Va. App. 499, 438 S.E.2d 769 (1993).
7. Id. at 503, 438 S.E.2d at 772 (quoting SLOANE-DoRLAND ANN. MEDICAL-LEGAL
DICTIONARY 209 (1987)).
8. See Jemmott, 251 Va. at 198, 467 S.E.2d at 801-02.
9. Id. at 199, 467 S.E.2d at 802.
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Subsequent to Jemmott, the Virginia Court of Appeals decid-
ed the case of Allied Fibers v. Rhodes.0 In Allied Fibers, the
Workers' Compensation Commission had awarded benefits to a
claimant for permanent hearing loss caused by noise expo-
sure." In reversing the full Commission decision and denying
the claim, however, the court of appeals concluded that "the
holding in Jemmott logically leads to the conclusion that a
hearing impairment resulting from cumulative trauma is not a
disease under the Act." 2 Accordingly, it was held that "hearing
loss caused by prolonged exposure to noise at work is a non-
compensable gradually incurred injury,"" although the court
recognized that prior to Jemmott, the Virginia Workers' Com-
pensation Commission and the court of appeals considered hear-
ing loss caused by exposure to noise at work to be a compensa-
ble disease. 4
As discussed later in this article, in response to Jemmott, the
1997 General Assembly amended the Act to include carpal
tunnel syndrome and hearing loss as compensable ordinary
diseases of life, provided that the requisite causal connection
with the employee's employment is established by clear and
convincing evidence. 5
B. Asbestos Claims
A more recent published opinion by the Virginia Court of
Appeals concerning an occupational disease claim was in Jones
v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.'" In Jones, the claimant
filed a claim for an occupational disease contracted as a result
of his exposure to asbestos in the course of his employment.
Following a hearing, the Deputy Commissioner made a factual
determination that the claimant had an occupational disease,
although the disease had not reached a ratable stage of asbes-
tosis for an award of permanent scheduled loss, pursuant to
10. 23 Va. App. 101, 474 S.E.2d 829 (1996).
11. Id. at 102-03, 474 S.E.2d at 830.
12. Id. at 104-05, 474 S.E.2d at 831.
13. See id. at 105, 474 S.E.2d at 831.
14. See id. at 104, 474 S.E.2d at 830-31.
15. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-400, -401 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
16. 24 Va. App. 36, 480 S.E.2d 129 (1997).
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Virginia Code section 65.2-503(B)(17). Nevertheless, lifetime
medical benefits were awarded to the claimant for his occupa-
tional disease.17 The full Commission reversed the Deputy
Commissioner's award, finding that since the claimant's asbes-
tosis had not reached a ratable level under Virginia Code sec-
tion 65.2-503, it therefore had not reached a compensable level,
and as such, medical benefits could not be awarded. 8
The court of appeals reversed the full Commission opinion in
Jones, noting that s]imply because the disease fails to rise to
the level of a permanent loss on the schedule of Code § 65.2-
503 does not automatically preclude an award of medical bene-
fits."9 Accordingly, the Court held that the claimant had a
compensable occupational disease, and was therefore entitled to
medical benefits. The court of appeals stated in Jones that
"[w]hether a permanent loss compensable under Code § 65.2-
503 accompanies the disease has no impact upon an award
under Code § 65.2-403. "20
II. INJURY BY ACCIDENT CLAIMS
A. Causation
In Dollar General Store v. Cridlin,2" the Virginia Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the full Commission which
held that the claimant sustained a compensable injury by acci-
dent.' In Cridlin, the claimant had assisted with the unload-
ing of a delivery truck over a "three-to-four-hour period, during
which time the claimant estimated that she unloaded close to
1,000 boxes."' The claimant testified to a specific, identifiable
incident, involving a particular box, at the hearing. In reports
to her treating physicians and supervisor, in her claim for bene-
fits, and in a conversation with the insurance carrier's claim
representative, however, the claimant merely described her inju-
17. Id. at 38, 480 S.E.2d at 130.
18. See id. at 37-38, 480 S.E.2d at 129-30.
19. Id. at 38, 480 S.E.2d at 130.
20. Id. at 39, 480 S.E.2d at 130.
21. 22 Va. App. 171, 468 S.E.2d 152 (1996).
22. See id at 174, 468 S.E.2d at 152.
23. Id. at 174, 468 S.E.2d at 153.
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ry as occurring while she was unloading boxes.' The
claimant's condition was diagnosed by medical personnel at the
hospital as an "overuse injury/bursitis right shoulder," and her
treating physician gave a diagnosis of "trapezius strain" and
"tendinitis of the right shoulder."'
In Cridlin, the court of appeals afred the credibility deter-
mination made by the Commission with regard to the
claimant's description of a compensable incident, further noting
that "the Commission was free to credit claimant's testimony at
the hearing as a basis for its finding of causation,"26 even
though the medical records did not causally relate the
claimant's condition to an identifiable incident. The court of
appeals disagreed with the employer's contention that the
Commission must look to the medical evidence in order to
determine the cause of the claimant's injury. The court noted
that the testimony of a claimant may be considered in deter-
mining causation, particularly where the medical testimony is
inconclusive, and that "[m]edical evidence is not necessarily




The Virginia Court of Appeals distinguished between an
idiopathic fall and an unexplained accident in the April 2, 1996
decision in PYAlMonarch & Reliance Insurance Co. v. Har-
risY In Harris, the claimant, a truck driver, "encountered
freezing rain and ice while making deliveries."' At his last de-
livery stop, the claimant opened the truck door, reached for the
grab bar on the outside of the truck's cab, and that was the
last that he could recall upon waking up on the pavement be-
side the truck, approximately seven feet below the driver's seat.0
24. Id. at 175, 468 S.E.2d at 153-54.
25. Id. at 175, 468 S.E.2d at 154.
26. Id. at 177, 468 S.E.2d at 155.
27. Id. at 176, 468 S.E.2d at 154 (quoting Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hob-
son, 11 Va. App. 675, 677, 401 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1991)).
28. 22 Va. App. 215, 468 S.E.2d 688 (1996).
29. Id. at 219, 468 S.E.2d at 690.
30. See / at 219, 468 S.E.2d at 690.
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In awarding this claim, the Commission was "persuaded that
the fall was precipitated by the design or icy condition of the
cab or both."31 The court in Harris discussed the three catego-
ries of risks causing injury to a claimant: (1) risks distinctly
associated with the employment; (2) risks personal to the
claimant; and (3) neutral risks, or risks having no particular
employment or personal character.32 The court noted that an
unexplained fall or accident is encompassed in the neutral risk
category,' and that while Virginia recognizes a presumption
that an unexplained injury by accident in the course of employ-
ment which results in the death of an employee "arose out of'
the employment,3 the Supreme Court of Virginia has refused
to extend the unexplained death presumption to the unex-
plained accident case.35
In reversing the full Commission's decision which found this
claim to be compensable, the court of appeals in Harris held
that this was an unexplained fall, and that the claimant failed
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his fall "arose
out of' his employment by establishing a causal connection be-
tween his employment and the fall.36 According to the court,
the fact that the truck cab was icy, or that the cab was approx-
imately seven feet from the ground, was insufficient to establish
the basis for the fall, even though the Commission was
"'persuaded' by the claimant that the icy condition and the
design of the truck caused the claimant's fall."" The claimant
in Harris could not remember any of the details of the accident,
and the last thing that he recalled was reaching for the grab
bar on the side of the truck cab. He did not testify that he
slipped or tripped on one of the ladder rungs, or that he lost
his grip on the grab bar. Accordingly, the court found that the
claimant failed to prove the requisite causal connection between
his employment and his fall. 8
31. Id. at 220, 468 S.E.2d at 690.
32. See id. at 221-23, 468 S.E.2d at 691-92.
33. See id. at 223, 468 S.E.2d at 692.
34. See Southern Motor Lines v. Alvis, 200 Va. 168, 104 S.E.2d 735 (1958).
35. See Pinkerton's, Inc. v. Helms, 242 Va. 378, 410 S.E.2d 646 (1991).
36. Harris, 22 Va. App. at 224, 468 S.E.2d at 692.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 225, 468 S.E.2d at 692.
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In Harris, the court of appeals also stated that it was im-
proper to extend the "increased effects analysis" used in idio-
pathic fall cases to an unexplained fall situation.39 While "the
effects of [an idiopathic] fall are compensable if the employment
places the employee in a position increasing the dangerous
effects of such a fall, such as on a height near machinery or
sharp corners, or in a moving vehicle,"40 the court noted that
the consequences of an unexplained fall are not compensable.4'
Ill. BENEFITS AND COVERAGE UNDER THE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT
A. Compensable Consequences Doctrine
The doctrine of compensable consequences is well-established
in Virginia Workers' Compensation jurisprudence. This doctrine
states: "[w]hen the primary injury is shown to have arisen out
of and in the course of employment, every natural consequence
that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employ-
ment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening
cause attributable to claimant's own intentional conduct."42
In Williams Industries, Inc. v. Wagoner,' decided February
11, 1997, the Virginia Court of Appeals applied the compensa-
ble consequences doctrine in finding the employer responsible
for the claimant's avascular necrosis (AVN) in both hips. The
claimant sustained a compensable back injury, although he was
diagnosed with AVN in his hips three years later." The medi-
cal evidence established that the claimant's bilateral hip condi-
tion was made worse by the back injury and related medical
treatment, and that the claimant's back condition had caused
wear and tear in his hips, aggravating the AVN condition."
The court of appeals held that since the medical evidence estab-
39. See id. at 225, 468 S.E.2d at 693.
40. Id. at 222-23, 468 S.E.2d at 691 (quoting Southland Corp. v. Parson, 1 Va.
App. 281, 284-85, 338 S.E.2d 162, 164 (1985) (citation omitted)).
41. See id. at 225, 468 S.E.2d at 693.
42. Morris v. Badger Powhatan/Figgie, Int'l, 3 Va. App. 276, 283, 348 S.E.2d 876,
879 (1986) (citation omitted).
43. 24 Va. App. 181, 480 S.E.2d 788 (1997).
44. See id. at 183-84, 480 S.E.2d at 789.
45. See id at 184-85, 480 S.E.2d at 789.
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lished that the claimant's increasingly debilitating AVN was a
natural consequence that flowed from and was a direct result of
his back injury, the bilateral AVN was a compensable conse-
quence of the back injury."
B. Permanent and Total Disability
The Virginia Court of Appeals spoke also with respect to
claims for permanent and total disability benefits pursuant to
Virginia Code section 65.2-503(C)." In LesCallett v. Rozansky
& Kay Construction Co.,' the claimant filed a claim for per-
manent and total disability benefits alleging the loss of use of
both of his legs as a result of a back injury sustained at work.
Although the claimant did not produce any evidence showing a
quantifiable loss of use to his legs, he produced medical evi-
dence showing he was industrially disabled and that the im-
pairment in his legs was a significant contributing factor to this
disability. 9 In affirming the Commission's denial of this claim
for permanent and total disability benefits, the court of appeals
reasoned that the claimant failed to quantify a functional loss
of his legs that could be translated into loss of both members
pursuant to Virginia Code section 65.2-503(C).' As stated in
LesCallett, a claimant first must present evidence rating the ex-
tent of disability of the affected members in order to qualify for
permanent and total disability benefits for the loss of use of
two members.5
C. Dependency
In Oil Transport, Inc. v. Jordan,52 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals addressed the issue of dependency in the context of a
parent seeking to recover benefits due to the death of a child.
In Jordan, the claimant was a mother whose son was killed in
46. See id. at 189, 480 S.E.2d at 792.
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-503(C) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
48. 23 Va. App. 404, 477 S.E.2d 746 (1996).
49. See id. at 405-07, 477 S.E.2d at 747-48.
50. See id at 407, 477 S.E.2d at 748.
51. See id. at 406, 477 S.E.2d at 747.
52. 22 Va. App. 633, 472 S.E.2d 291 (1996).
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a work-related accident. The Commission awarded dependency
benefits to the claimant pursuant to Virginia Code sections
65.2-512(A)(2) and -515(A)(4) " because it determined that she
was a parent in destitute circumstances.'
Virginia Code section 65.2-515(A)(4) provides that "[p]arents
in destitute circumstances, provided there be no total depen-
dents pursuant to other provisions of this section," are
"conclusively presumed to be dependents wholly dependent for
support upon the deceased employee."5 The court in Jordan
expanded on the definition of destitute by stating that: "[a]
parent with 'only the earning potential sufficient to provide no
more than a bare existence with no resources to provide against
reasonably anticipated or inevitable financial emergencies' is
deemed 'financially vulnerable' and, therefore, destitute for the
purposes of Code § 65.2-515(A)(4).""
In reversing the Commission's award of benefits and in dis-
missing this claim, the court of appeals in Jordan held that the
claimant "failed to meet her burden of proving dependency,
whether actual or as a result of being financially vulnerable." '
The court noted that at the Commission's hearing, the claimant
failed to provide even approximate dollar amounts of her son's
contributions to her expenses: she produced no tax returns, no
documentation of bills being paid by her son, nor did she pro-
duce any other tangible objective evidence of dependency. "
Moreover, she "testified to no reasonably anticipated or inevi-
table financial emergency at the time of her son's death."59
Accordingly, since the Commission had insufficient evidence to
determine that the claimant was in destitute circumstances, the
court of appeals reversed the award of benefits, finding that the
claimant failed to meet her burden of proving her entitlement
to dependency benefits.'
53. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-512(AX2), -515(AX4) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp.
1997).
54. See Jordan, 22 Va. App. at 634-35, 472 S.E.2d at 292.
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-515(AX4) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum Supp. 1997).
56. Jordan, 22 Va. App. at 636, 472 S.E.2d at 292 (quoting Roanoke Belt, Inc. v.
Mroczkowski, 20 Va. App. 60, 71, 455 S.E.2d 267, 272 (1995)).
57. Id. at 636, 472 S.E.2d at 292-93.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. See iUL at 636-37, 472 S.E.2d at 292-93.
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D. Employee vs. Independent Contractor
In County of Spotsylvania v. Walker,61 decided July 15,
1997, the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the full
Commission's determination that the claimant was an employ-
ee, finding instead that the claimant was an independent con-
tractor and, therefore, not entitled to receive benefits pursuant
to the Workers' Compensation Act.62 In Walker, the claimant
had entered into an "Individual Vendor Agreement" with the
County's Department of Social Services. She entered the
County's companion services program, which was designed to
assist low income elderly or disabled individuals with their
daily living skills." The claimant suffered an accidental work-
related injury. The issue presented was whether the claimant
was an employee as set forth in the Act, or whether she was an
independent contractor.'
In finding that the claimant was an independent contractor,
the majority of the court recognized that the power or right of
control is the most significant factor in determining whether a
claimant is an employee or an independent contractor, and that
the primary inquiry focuses on the power or right to control the
means and methods by which the result is to be accomplished.
The court reasoned that since there was no evidence indicating
that the County of Spotsylvania had the right of control over
the means and methods by which the claimant performed her
services, she was, therefore, an independent contractor," The
court concluded that "[t]here is no evidence that the County
directed or controlled how services were to be performed" or
that the County had "day-to-day supervisory responsibility.' °
Moreover, the claimant controlled the number of hours that she
worked. She could freely accept or decline an offer from the
61. 25 Va. App. 224, 487 S.E.2d 274 (1997).
62. See id. at 224-26, 487 S.E.2d at 274-75. Judge Benton authored a dissenting
opinion because he agreed with the full Commission's determination that the claimant
was an employee and not an independent contractor. See id. at 239, 487 S.E.2d at
281.
63. See id. at 226, 487 S.E.2d at 275.
64. See id. at 226-27, 487 S.E.2d at 275.
65. See id. at 231, 487 S.E.2d at 277.
66. Id. at 232, 487 S.E.2d at 277.
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County to provide services to a particular client, and the Coun-
ty did not retain the absolute right to discharge claimant.67
Relying upon the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Gill," the court of appeals in Walker
concluded that the claimant retained the right to control the
means and methods in order to provide the desired services to
the County of Spotsylvania."9
IV. THmD-PARTY CLAIMs
A claim against an employer for benefits under the Virginia
Workers' Compensation Act "operate[s] as an assignment to the
employer of any right to recover damages which the injured
employee, his personal representative or other person may have
against any other party for such injury or death, and [the]
employer shall be subrogated to any such right" to recover
damages.70 In Virginia, an employee's benefits under the
Worker's Compensation Act are terminated "[w]hen an
employer's right to subrogation is defeated by an employee's
settlement with a third party without the knowledge or consent
of the employer" and/or insurance carrier.71 Two recent deci-
sions from the Virginia Court of Appeals have further clarified
the law in this regard.
In White Electric Co. v. Bak,72 it was held that where the
facts established that the amount of benefits that an employer
is entitled to recover under Virginia Code section 65.2-309 is
limited, and a compromise settlement unilaterally agreed to by
the claimant in his third party suit is sufficient to compensate
the employer for the benefits paid, the claimant's unilateral
settlement does not prejudice the employer and the claimant's
entitlement to future benefits is not terminated." In Bak, the
claimant was involved in an automobile accident subsequent to
67. See id.
68. 224 Va. 92, 294 S.E.2d 840 (1982).
69. See Walker, 25 Va. App. at 234, 487 S.E.2d at 278-79.
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-309 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1997).
71. Green v. Warwick Plumbing & Heating Corp., 5 Va. App. 409, 412, 364
S.E.2d 4, 6 (1988); see also Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Van Hoy, 225 Va. 64, 300 S.E.2d
750 (1983).
72. 22 Va. App. 17, 467 S.E.2d 827 (1996).
73. See id. at 22-23, 467 S.E.2d at 829-30.
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his industrial accident and it was alleged in his Motion for
Judgment that he suffered an aggravation of the injuries previ-
ously sustained in his industrial accident. 4 The claimant set-
tled his motor vehicle claim without notifying the employer or
insurance carrier." The Commission determined that the third
party settlement was sufficient for the employer to fully recover
the costs of medical care attributable to the intervening acci-
dent and that, therefore, the claimant's benefits under the Act
for treatment of the work injury were not forfeited.76 The Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals affirmed the full Commission decision,
finding that "the aggravation of claimant's condition was short-
lived and insufficient to justify a finding that the third-party
settlement prejudiced employer's subrogation rights."77
The employer's subrogation rights were also found not to
have been prejudiced in Overhead Door Co. of Norfolk v. Lew-
is.78 In Lewis, the claimant employed an attorney to represent
him with respect to a third party claim. The employer was
aware of the suit that had been filed against the third parties
and advised claimant's counsel, orally and in writing, that the
employer relied upon the attorney to protect its subrogation
rights.7" Because counsel failed to comply with certain proce-
dures, the third party case was dismissed, with prejudice, be-
fore the claim could be heard on its merits."0 The employer
filed an application for a hearing with the Commission, request-
ing that the claimant's benefits be terminated, contending that
the claimant impaired its right of subrogation against the third
parties.8
In affirming the Commission, which had dismissed the
employer's application for a hearing, the court of appeals in
Lewis held that the employer was not entitled to the relief
requested.82 The court held that a claimant is not barred from
receiving workers' compensation benefits when his attorney
74. See id. at 20, 467 S.E.2d at 829.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 22, 467 S.E.2d at 829-30.
77. Id. at 23, 467 S.E.2d at 830.
78. 22 Va. App. 240, 468 S.E.2d 700 (1996).
79. See id. at 242, 468 S.E.2d at 701.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 242, 468 S.E.2d at 701-02.
1294
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
negligently caused his third party action to be dismissed with
prejudice, finding that there is no support in the Act for the
employer's assertion that unauthorized acts or omissions of the
claimant's attorney which result in the loss of the employer's
subrogation rights will relieve the employer/carrier of paying
further compensation benefits.'
V. THE TERMINATION OF WAGE BENEFITS
A. Full Duty Release
In Fingles Co. v. Tatterson," the employer sought to termi-
nate the claimant's wage benefits on the basis of a full duty
release. The uncontradicted medical evidence established that
the claimant had no physical limitations or restrictions, and
that the claimant could return to full activities, including
work.' While the Deputy Commissioner held that the employ-
er met its burden of proof, and terminated wage benefits, the
majority of the full Commission reversed the Deputy Commis-
sioner, noting that nothing in the record indicated that either of
the claimant's treating physicians was familiar with the
claimant's pre-injury duties, and that, therefore, "the employ-
er.... presented no evidence that [the] claimant had been
unequivocally released to return to unrestricted work."'
The court of appeals reversed the Commission's decision in
Tatterson, finding that an employer has met its burden of prov-
ing that the claimant is able to return to pre-injury work by
presenting uncontradicted evidence which establishes that no
restrictions have been placed on the claimant's ability to return
to work.8" Accordingly, it was held that "where uncontradicted
medical evidence does not suggest any physical limitation on a
83. See id
84. 22 Va. App. 638, 472 S.E.2d 646 (1996).
85. See id. at 641, 472 S.E.2d at 647.
86. Id. at 640-41, 472 S.E.2d at 647.
87. See id. at 642, 472 S.E.2d at 647.
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claimant, the employer need not also show that the physician
was familiar with the physical requirements of the job."'
B. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Murphy: Forfeiture
Rule
In the March 11, 1997 opinion of the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals in Walter Reed Convalescent Center/Virginia Health Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Reese, 9 the court had an opportunity to discuss
the forfeiture rule enunciated in Chesapeake & Potomac Tele-
phone Co. of Virginia v. Murphy." The court in Reese applied
the applicable law on forfeiture as set forth in Eppling v.
Schultz Dining Programs/Commonwealth of Virginia,91 where
the court of appeals noted that "in order to work a [Chesapeake
& Potomac Telephone Co. v. Murphy] forfeiture, the 'wage loss
[must be] properly attributable to [the employee's] wrongful
act ... [for which t]he employee is responsible."'9 The court
in Reese noted that, as stated in Eppling, the forfeiture rule
applies when a disabled employee is discharged from selective
employment, and whether the reasons for the discharge are
justified for purposes of forfeiting benefits "must be determined
in the context of the purpose of the Act and whether the con-
duct is of such a nature that it warrants permanent forfeiture
of those rights and benefits."93
In Reese, the claimant, a licensed practical nurse, returned to
work for her employer in a light duty capacity. The records
88. Id. at 642, 472 S.E.2d at 648.
89. 24 Va. App. 328, 482 S.E.2d 92 (1997).
90. 12 Va. App. 633, 406 S.E.2d 190 (1991), affd en banc, 13 Va. App. 304, 411
S.E.2d 444 (1991). According to the forfeiture rule as set forth in Murphy, a disabled
employee forfeits his wage benefits when he is terminated for cause from selective
employment procured by the employer. See id. at 639, 406 S.E.2d at 193. The court
noted that where a disabled employee is terminated for cause from light duty work
procured by the employer, any subsequent wage loss is attributable to the wrongful
act and not his disability, and that the claimant, not the employer, is responsible for
that loss. See id. at 639-40, 406 S.E.2d at 193.
91. 18 Va. App. 125, 442 S.E.2d 219 (1994). A disabled employee who is dis-
charged for cause from selective employment procured by the employer will perma-
nently forfeit wage benefits only when the employee's dismissal for cause is justified.
See id. at 129-30, 442 S.E.2d at 221-22.
92. Id. at 129, 442 S.E.2d at 222.
93. Reese, 24 Va. App. at 336, 482 S.E.2d at 96-97 (quoting Eppling, 18 Va. App.
at 128, 442 S.E.2d at 221).
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showed that the employer disciplined the claimant upon her
returning to light duty work numerous times for, among other
things, failing to complete forms, failing to transcribe orders,
placing a physician's order in the wrong book, erroneous tran-
scriptions of forms or orders, improperly placing an order, and
failing to hang up door cards." The claimant was also disci-
plined for "failing to transcribe a physician's orders to the medi-
cation administration record, causing a patient not to receive
his medication."95 The claimant was eventually terminated.
The court of appeals held that the evidence established as a
matter of law that the claimant's wrongful acts, which jeopar-
dized the employer's patients, caused her wage loss, and that
the claimant's termination was unrelated to her injury and was
due solely to her misconduct.96 Since "credible evidence estab-
lished that [the] claimant's failure to properly perform her job
was caused by her incompetence, [and] not her injury ... [and
since n]o credible evidence showed that claimant's mistakes
were caused by her injury or its residual effects,"97 the court
held that the claimant's wage benefits were forfeited pursuant
to Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Murphy.98
C. Claimant's Return to Work
In Odin, Inc. v. Price,99 the Virginia Court of Appeals held
that the Commission correctly assessed a twenty percent penal-
ty against an employer, where the employer unilaterally ceased
payment of temporary total disability wage benefits based upon
the claimant's return to work at a wage less than his pre-injury
wage, without filing an Agreed Statement of Fact or a change
in condition Application for Hearing."°° The court noted that
Rule 1.4(C)(1) of the Rules of the Virginia Workers' Compensa-
tion Commission allows an employer to cease payment of com-
pensation on the date that an employee returns to work only
when the employer files an application alleging that the em-
94. See id. at 331-32, 482 S.E.2d at 94.
95. Id. at 332, 482 S.E.2d at 94.
96. See id. at 338, 482 S.E.2d at 97-98.
97. Id. at 338-39, 482 S.E.2d at 98 (emphasis added).
98. See id at 338-39, 482 S.E.2d at 97-98.
99. 23 Va. App. 66, 474 S.E.2d 162 (1996).
100. See id. at 72-73, 474 S.E.2d at 164.
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ployee returned to work.'01 In Odin, the employer never filed
an application alleging that the claimant returned to work. The
employer unilaterally stopped paying compensation to the
claimant, even though the employer conceded that the claimant
was entitled to some form of compensation subsequent to the
date that wage benefits were terminated." The court of ap-
peals affirmed the assessment of a penalty for the late payment
of compensation pursuant to Virginia Code section 65.2-524."
VI. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING WORKERS'
COMPENSATION
A. Legislative Changes in 1997
The most significant legislative change of 1997 concerns car-
pal tunnel syndrome and hearing loss claims, as the Workers'
Compensation Act was amended to include carpal tunnel syn-
drome and hearing loss as compensable ordinary diseases of
life, provided that the requisite causal connection with the
employee's employment is established by clear and convincing
evidence.' This legislation was enacted in response to the
Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Stenrich Group v.
Jemmott, discussed earlier in this article. Pursuant to Jemmott,
all other job-related impairments resulting from cumulative
trauma caused by repetitive motion are not compensable.0 5
This amendment pertains only to hearing loss and carpal tun-
nel syndrome claims.
Additionally, the General Assembly passed a bill stating that
where a claimant receives permanent partial disability wage
benefits pursuant to Virginia Code section 65.2-503 and is si-
multaneously paid temporary partial disability wage benefits
under Virginia Code section 65.2-502, each combined payment
101. See id. at 71, 474 S.E.2d at 164.
102. See id. at 69-70, 474 S.E.2d at 163-64.
103. See id. at 73, 474 S.E.2d at 165.
104. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-400, -401 (Cun. Supp. 1997). Virginia Code sec-
tion 65.2-401 was amended to clarify that in order to have a compensable ordinary
disease of life, the elements of causation must be established by clear and convincing
evidence, "not a mere probability." VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-401 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
105. Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 199, 467 S.E.2d 795, 802 (1996).
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counts as two weeks against the 500-week maximum entitle-
ment to wage benefits.'O'
Further, new legislation mandates that total compensation
cannot exceed 500 weeks, nor the results obtained by multiply-
ing the average weekly wage of the Commonwealth for the
applicable year of the accident by 500, except in cases of per-
manent and total disability pursuant to Virginia Code section
65.2-503(C), permanent disability under Virginia Code section
65.2-504(A)(4), and death from coal workers' pneumoconiosis
under Code section 65.2-513. °7
The notice provision of the Workers' Compensation Act was
amended to reflect that a statutory employer who is not given
notice of an accident within thirty days of the accident may
still be held responsible for awards of compensation if. (1) the
statutory employer has had sixty days' notice of the hearing to
ascertain compensability of the accident; and (2) the statutory
employer was not prejudiced by the lack of notice of the acci-
dent.'08
The General Assembly amended the statute involving the
issuance of written decisions by the Full Commission or Deputy
Commissioners, as copies of an award or opinion following a
hearing before a Deputy Commissioner or review must now be
sent to the parties at issue by registered or certified mail.'0 9
A new enactment provides that a determination of employee
status made by the Commission or by a Virginia court shall
estop either party from asserting otherwise in any subsequent
action. This statute applies to final, unappealed awards or or-
ders in cases involving the same parties and upon the same
claims or causes of action."0
The statute concerning assessment of attorney's fees and
costs against an employer and/or insurance carrier has been
amended to further state that, where it is found by the Com-
mission that an employer or insurance carrier filed an applica-
106. See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-503 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
107. See id. § 65.2-518 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
108. See id. § 65.2-60 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
109. See id. § 65.2-704 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
110. See id. § 65.2-706.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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tion for hearing in bad faith, there shall be an assessment
against the employer or insurance carrier in an amount up to
ten percent of the total amount of benefits accrued from the
date that the Commission determines that the award should
have been paid through the date of the award. This assessment
will be in addition to any other costs, fees, or awards set forth
in this code provision. 1 '
The General Assembly also passed legislation requiring insur-
ers, for a period of no more than four years, to provide premi-
um discounts of up to five percent to each employer instituting
a drug-free workplace program which satisfies the criteria es-
tablished by the insurer."2
B. Legislative Changes in 1996
Virginia Code section 65.2-101 was amended to exclude from
the definition of "employee" a person performing services as a
sports official for an entity sponsoring an interscholastic or
intercollegiate sporting event, or as a sports official for a public
entity or a private, nonprofit organization which sponsors an
amateur sporting event."' However, this exclusion does not
apply to any person who performs services as a sports official
as part of his or her regular employment."
Virginia Code section 65.2-505 was amended to reflect that
any employee who has a permanent disability, or who has sus-
tained a permanent injury, and who receives a subsequent
permanent injury by accident, as specified in Virginia Code
section 65.2-503, with the same employer, is entitled to compen-
sation only for the degree of incapacity that would have result-
ed from the subsequent accident if the previous injury or dis-
ability had not existed."5 This code provision does not apply
to an employee's vision or hearing loss that has not reached a
compensable level."'
111. See id. § 65.2-713 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
112. See id. § 65.2-813.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
113. See id. § 65.2-101 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
114. See id.




The statute concerning a claimant's refusal of selective em-
ployment was also amended. Virginia Code section 65.2-510(C)
now includes language that when an injured employee is pre-
cluded from accepting suitable light duty work due to pregnan-
cy, the six-month period for curing a refusal of light duty em-
ployment may be tolled during such period as a physician certi-
fies medical disability.11
Additionally, Virginia Code section 65.2-712 was amended to
reflect that a statutory dependent pursuant to Virginia Code
section 65.2-515 must immediately disclose to the employer,
when self-insured, or to the insurance carrier in all other cases,
any remarriage or change in status as a full-time student. 8
Failure to do so may entitle the employer or insurance carrier
to a credit against future compensation payments due, or to
pursue an action at law against the statutory dependent in
order to recover the overpayment. 9
117. See id. § 65.2-510(C) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
118. See id. § 65.2-712 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
119. See id.
1997] 1301

